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1 
1 Introduction 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was 
adopted in Kyoto in December 1997. The Kyoto Protocol requires the participating developed 
countries to reduce their collective emissions of six key greenhouse gases by 5.2% below 
1990 levels in the period 2008–2012.  
 Under the Kyoto Protocol, the participating countries will have a certain flexibility in 
how they make their emissions reductions. At the international level, the Protocol gives the 
Parties the opportunity to meet their emissions targets through the following flexibility 
mechanisms3: 
• Emissions trading with other Annex B countries.4 The relevant principles, rules, and 
guidelines for emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol, have not, however, been 
agreed upon yet. (COP 6 in November last year unfortunately did not make much 
progress on this issue.) The text of the Kyoto Protocol states that any such trading must 
be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission 
limits and reduction commitments under the Article. (Article number 17).  
• Joint Implementation (JI) projects with other Annex B parties. JI under the Kyoto 
Protocol involves cooperation between two Annex B countries to meet their abatement 
targets.  The investor funds and possibly also conducts emissions reduction projects in 
the host country. This allows the investor country to offset their commitment by the 
amount of reduced climate gases through the JI project. JI may function as an important 
interim mechanism while an emissions trading system within Annex B countries is 
being developed and may afterwards function as an important mechanism for 
transferring technology and skills.  Investment in JI projects must also be supplemental 
to domestic actions for the purpose of fulfilling commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol. (Article number 6).. 
• The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Like JI, the CDM is a project-based 
mechanism, although the projects involve cooperation between one Annex B country 
and one developing country. In other words, the CDM allows developed countries to 
use certified emission reductions from verified and accepted project activities in 
developing countries to contribute to their compliance with greenhouse gas reduction 
targets. The Protocol text states that the Parties included in Annex B may use the 
certified emission reductions accruing from such project activities toward part of their 
quantified emissions limitation and reduction commitments. (Article number 12). 
 Thus all three flexibility mechanisms include a reference to supplementarity or as being 
limited to being part of the Parties’ quantified emissions limits. This reflects the EU position 
and the concerns of some developing countries associated with a non-restricted trading 
system. In this paper I focus on the arguments that can be used or have been used to defend a 
supplementarity principle, and to a certain extent comment on the validity of these arguments. 
I will narrow the focus by concentrating on emissions trading (rather than looking at all three 
                                                     
3 A fourth flexibility mechanism is also referred to in the literature, namely Article 4 – Joint Fulfillment 
(JF). JF allows Parties with emissions reduction commitments to jointly meet their commitments by 
entering into an agreement that redistributes the total reductions among parties to the agreement. Once 
the agreement is finalized and deposited with the secretariat, the revised emissions reduction target for 
each participating Party becomes enforceable under the Protocol. This flexibility mechanism will not 
be discussed any further in this paper. 
 
4 The Annex B countries under the Kyoto Protocol include most members of the OECD (except South 
Korea, Mexico and Turkey) plus some Central and Eastern European states. 
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flexibility mechanisms), and I will primarily focus on the EU position that emissions trading 
must be supplemental to domestic action and their somewhat skeptical views toward 
emissions trading. Other countries, particularly developing countries, are also skeptical 
toward emissions trading. However, many of their arguments against emissions trading will 
be covered through the various arguments found in the EU position.  
 Below, I briefly discuss the EU proposal for how the supplementarity cap can be 
operationalized. Furthermore, I discuss the standard economic view of quota trading by both 
looking at the efficiency and cost-effectiveness concepts and the effects of quota restrictions 
related to the standard economic view. In section four, I briefly discuss the negotiation 
process in the Kyoto negotiations connected to the supplementarity cap. In section five, I look 
at the arguments that can or are being used to defend a supplementarity cap. I discuss 
economic arguments, arguments connected to technological progress, hot air5 andethics. 
Concluding remarks are given in section six.  
 
2 The EU proposal 
On May 17, 1999, the European Union Council of Ministers agreed on a Community strategy 
for climate change. This strategy included recommended definitions of supplementarity; 
specifically it proposed limits on the share of emissions reductions a country might obtain 
through use of the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms. 
The EU proposal is divided into two sections: rules for buyers and rules for sellers. In 
the buyer case, two options are provided. Annex B parties’ purchases may not exceed the 
higher of the two (refer to UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 2000).  
 5% of 
base year emissions multiplied by 5 +  assigned amount
2
  (1) 
 
 50% of the difference between the actual annual emissions of any year  
between 1994 and 2002 multiplied by 5, and its assigned amount.   (2) 
 However, the limit on acquisitions can be increased. The EU suggests that the ceiling 
on net acquisitions can be increased to the extent that a Party included 
in Annex B achieves emission reductions larger than the relevant 
ceiling in the commitment period through domestic action undertaken 
after 1993, if demonstrated by the Party in a verifiable manner and 
subject to the expert review process to be developed under Article 8 
[in the Kyoto Protocol]. (UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 2000)   
 An example from Norway could clarify the options. (Alfsen 1999. Year 2010 is here 
used as a representative year for the first commitment period and 1996 is chosen as the freely 
chosen year between 1994 and 2002). The first row of the table shows the emissions of 
climate gases in 1990 and 1996 and the allowed emissions following from the commitment in 
the Kyoto Protocol in 2010. The second and third rows show the allowed amount of bought 
quotas. The first option (defined by equation (1) above) gives as we can see, the best outcome 
for Norway when it comes to the amount of bought quotas. (The second option is defined by 
equation (2) above). 
                                                     
5 Parties that are allocated assigned amounts that exceed what their emissions would be even in the 
absence of any limitation contribute to the so-called hot air problem when the other Parties purchase 
these quotas to help meet their targets.  
CICERO Working Paper 2001: 07 
Why quota trade should be restricted: The arguments behind the EU position on emissions trading 
 
 
 3
 
Table 1: Total emissions, emissions targets, and purchased permits. Mt CO2 equivalents. 
 1990 1996 2010 
Emissions of 
climate gases 
54.1 57.2 54.6 
Option 1   2.7 
Option 2   0.6 
Source: Alfsen 1999. 
  
 The EU also suggests restrictions on sale of quotas. The restriction on sales is given by 
equation 1 above. However, as in the case of a limit for net acquisitions, there is an 
opportunity in the EU suggestion to increase the ceiling: 
the ceiling on net transfers can be increased to the extent that a Party included in 
Annex B achieves emission reductions larger than the relevant ceiling in the 
commitment period through domestic action undertaken after 1993, if 
demonstrated by the Party in a verifiable manner and subject to the expert review 
process to be developed under Article 8 [in the Kyoto Protocol]. (UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 2000)  
Hence, the limit on transfers is only binding for countries with hot air quotas. (For discussion 
and definition of the hot air issue see section 5.2). A country with no hot air quotas will not 
sell any quotas not resulting from an equivalent emissions reduction.   
 
3 Efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
Most economists would argue that an emissions trading system connected to climate gases 
should be unrestricted, i.e. that agents should be able to trade as many quotas they like in the 
market according to the goal of emissions reductions set by the authorities or as here defined 
through an international agreement. The reason for favoring free quota trade is connected to 
the efficiency concept in economics, where free quota trade in a competitive market for 
quotas would give a cost-effective outcome; that is, emissions goal would be attained in the 
cheapest way possible. Below, I first discuss what economic efficiency related to the climate 
change problem would mean, and then I discuss the cost-effectiveness concept.  
 
3.1 An efficient level of climate gases 
The optimal level of climate gases in the atmosphere could be defined by using the economic 
efficiency concept. In order to define the optimal level of climate gases, one has to define 
both the cost function and the benefit (damage) function of reduced emissions of climate 
gases. An optimal emissions level is given by the following maximization problem:6 
                                                     
6 In reality, this is a simplification of the efficiency problem in the climate change context. To be exact, 
the time dimension of the problem should also be taken into account. We should then maximize the 
damages from climate change minus the cost of abatement over time, and end up with finding the 
optimal path of climate emissions through the time horizon.  
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function for country j. 
 This maximization problem gives the following first order condition: 
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which signifies that an optimal level for reductions of climate gases for agent j is reached 
when the sum of marginal benefits of abatement equals the marginal abatement costs.  
 
3.2 Cost-effectiveness 
Often there is a considerable degree of uncertainty and lack of information regarding the 
damage function, which makes it difficult to apply the efficiency concept given above. 
Instead, a cost-effectiveness approach could be applied. This has the advantage of avoiding 
the specification of a benefit (damage) relationship for climate gases in the form of a benefit 
(damage) function.  
 The optimal level of climate gas emissions is chosen by the regulator, or through a 
negotiating process (as with the Kyoto Protocol), without considering the optimal level of 
climate gases given through efficiency considerations. A cost-effective environmental 
agreement is one that reaches the agreed level of emissions reductions in the cheapest way 
possible, i.e. 
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where E0 is the chosen target for the total emissions from all agents (countries). 
 
 The first order condition of this minimization problem is: 
λ=−′ )( 0 jjj eeC     for all j= 1,....,N     (7) 
where λ is the shadow price of the constraint (6). 
 This condition signifies that cost-effectiveness requires that the marginal abatement 
costs are equalized across agents (countries), or, in other words, that the cost of reducing 
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climate emissions with one more unit in one country is equal to the cost of reducing climate 
emissions with one more unit in another country. 
 Obviously, efficiency implies cost-effectiveness. An efficient climate agreement is 
hence one where the emissions reduction target is optimally chosen, and where this target is 
reached in the cheapest way possible.  
 
3.3 A tradable quota system 
In a competitive tradable market for emission quotas, a cost-effective or efficient solution is 
reached if the environmental goals are optimally chosen. Each agent in this market minimizes 
the cost of abatement and the cost (income) of buying (selling) quotas subject to the emissions 
from the agent being less or equal to the initial endowment of quotas plus (minus) the amount 
of bought (sold) quotas. 
jjjj
qq
PqeeCMin
N
+− )( 0
,...,1
       (8) 
subject to: jjj qqe +=
0        (9) 
where qj is the amount of quotas bought (-qj is the amount of quotas sold), q0j is the initial 
amount of quotas allocated and P is the price of quotas.  
 The first order condition of this minimization problem is: 
PeeC jjj =−′ )(
0   for all j= 1, ......,N    (10) 
In other words, each agent would set marginal abatement cost equal to the price of a quota in 
optimum. A cost-effective situation is achieved since the price of a quota is the same for 
every country, and marginal abatement costs will hence be equalized across agents.  
 The cost-effectiveness of a competitive quota market could also be illustrated by the 
following figure, which shows the demand and supply curves for quotas in the quota market 
(q is the quantity of quotas). Both the supply and demand curves reflect the marginal 
abatement costs for the agents operating in the market. The buyers would purchase quotas as 
long as the price of a quota is less than the buyers’ marginal abatement costs. With an 
increasing marginal abatement function, this would signify that the higher the quota price, the 
lower the demand for quotas and the higher the levels of abatement. Hence, the demand curve 
slopes downward. On the other hand, the sellers would sell quotas as long as the quota price is 
higher than the sellers’ marginal abatement costs. Likewise, with an increasing marginal 
abatement cost function, this would imply that the higher the quota price quota, the higher the 
supply of quotas and the higher the levels of abatement. Hence, the supply curve slopes 
upward. The equilibrium price and quantity in the competitive quota market is given by (P*, 
q*). Since the demand and supply curves also reflect the marginal abatement costs of the 
agent, the competitive equilibrium will be a cost-effective equilibrium where the targets set 
through the international agreement are reached in the cheapest way possible.  
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Supply
Demand
P*
q* q
 
 
Figure 1: The competitive quota market 
 
3.4 The effects of restricting quota trade 
3.4.1 Ceiling on purchases  
What would the effects of a ceiling on buying as suggested by EU be? It is assumed that this 
ceiling leads to binding restrictions on buying quotas, i.e. that the allowed level of purchased 
quotas is lower than q*. In figure 2, the ceiling on purchases is given by qR. In this situation 
we would no longer have equality between agents’ marginal abatement costs (expressed by 
the supply and demand curves). The marginal abatement costs for buyers are given by PD, and 
for sellers, by PS. As a consequence, a cost-effective solution is no longer secured. 
 
Supply
Ceiling on purchases
Demand
PD
P*
PS
qR q* q
 
 
Figure 2: Ceiling on purchases 
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3.4.2 Ceiling on sales 
As mentioned above, the EU proposes that sale of quotas be restricted by equation (1) above. 
However, a Party could sell more than the amount given by the ceiling if it carries out 
abatement larger than the ceiling.7 Hence, the ceiling is in reality only effective for hot air 
quotas. A Party with hot air quotas then faces a discrete choice. It could either sell the amount 
given by the ceiling, or it could increase the ceiling (increase the amount sold) if it abates the 
whole amount that it sells. The decision it actually makes will depend on on the profit 
resulting from each of these choices.  
 With a restriction on sales of quotas such as the one explained above (and assuming 
that the ceiling will be effective), the supply curve would shift inward but at one point the 
new supply curve will not be continuous, reflecting the fact that the Parties with hot air quotas 
will at one point have equal incentives to sell quotas according to the ceiling or to abate the 
whole amount of sold quotas. (See figure 3). The supply curve with the suggested ceiling will 
have the same slope as the original supply curve when the hot air countries abate the entire 
amount of quotas sold. The only thing that happens is that they do not sell any quotas that are 
not a result of an equivalent emission reduction. The curve will be steeper when the hot air 
countries only sell their amount of hot air quotas according to the ceiling.  The new 
equilibrium after the restrictions with the curves drawn in the diagram is (qR, PR). In this case, 
the marginal abatement costs would be equalized across agents and be equal to PR, since all 
supplying agents here abate the entire amount of quotas that they sell. However, the level of 
emissions reductions would be higher than the level agreed to in the Kyoto negotiations since 
there are no longer hot air quotas and all the quotas that are sold are a result of an equivalent 
emissions reduction. The agreed goal could, however, be reached at a lower cost by including 
the hot air quotas in quota trading (and not over-fulfilling the target defined through the 
agreement). Marginal abatement costs and total costs would in this case be lower, thus 
implying that the establishment of restrictions would mean that targets would not be attained 
in the cheapest way possible.  
 
Supply
Ceiling on sales
Demand
PR
P*
qR q* q
 
Figure 3: Ceiling on sales, situation 1. 
                                                     
7 In reality, the possibility of increasing the ceiling by abating according to the amount of quotas sold 
signifies that the costs of the compliance system increase compared to only having a ceiling given by 
equation (1). With a restriction like this, all quota sales above the ceiling require that each source 
establish the emissions baseline, permitted level, and reduction plan for each trade, since it must be 
verified that a Party actually carries out abatement according to the quotas it sells. Thus, this is more 
like a credit-trading mechanism than ordinary allowance trading. For a brief discussion of this issue, 
see section 5.1.2. 
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Another situation is sketched out in figure 4. Here the Parties with hot air quotas only choose 
to sell according to the ceiling, which represents only a part of their hot air quotas. The 
marginal abatement costs of the hot air quotas are equal to zero. The other selling countries 
with no hot air will, however, experience positive marginal abatement costs equal to the price 
PR. In this situation, we will no longer have cost effectiveness since marginal abatement costs 
will be unequal across agents.  
 
Supply
Ceiling on sales
Demand
PR
P*
qR q* q
 
Fig. 4: Ceiling on sales, situation 2. 
 
3.4.3 Ceilings on both purchases and sales  
The supply and demand of quotas will be affected for those agents where the ceilings actually 
restrict their purchases and sales of quotas. The Parties that experience effective restrictions 
on purchases and those who choose to sell hot air quotas in accordance with the ceiling given 
by equation (1) will no longer set marginal abatement costs equal to price, and cost 
ineffectiveness is the result. (As discussed above, Parties with hot-air quotas that choose to 
sell quotas above the ceiling will have to abate according to the amount of quotas sold, and 
those agents will set marginal abatement costs equal to price). Hence, the EU ceiling with 
restrictions on both purchases and sales of quotas will clearly result in ineffectiveness. So, the 
question is, why argue for having ceilings? 
 
4 The negotiating process 
 
4.1 The EU 
In the Kyoto negotiations, the EU’s main focus was on internal policies and measures that its 
member states might adopt, and the effort to hold other countries to flat-rate emission 
reductions. Before the Kyoto negotiations in March 1997, the EU collectively supported a 
position that all industrialized countries should reduce emissions to 15% below 1990 levels by 
2010. On the topic of emissions trading, the EU remained silent in its March statement. 
However, in June 1997 the EU indicated that its attitude toward emissions trading would be 
contingent upon the strength of commitments offered by other countries and the requirement 
that using mechanisms such as emissions trading be supplementary to domestic actions.  
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4.2 The United States, Japan, and other OECD countries 
The eyes of many OECD countries were focused on how they could lessen domestic pressure, 
and as a result they argued as hard as possible for international flexibility. Many economic 
analyses showed that emissions reductions could be achieved most cheaply in the economies 
perceived to be the least efficient: the EITs and developing countries. International flexibility 
would thus provide an opportunity to take advantage of these cost-reduction possibilities.  
 Although positive toward emissions trading, some OECD countries, especially Japan, 
expressed concerns about the functioning of the emissions trading market. They worried that 
the US would use its potentially enormous political leverage over Russia to monopolize 
Russia’s surplus of quotas resulting from the commitments of the Kyoto Protocol and its 
economic development if the emissions trading system was not designed properly. So – along 
with several other countries  – Japan demanded conditions that any trading should be 
transparent, competitive, and open. However, Japan was positive towards cost-effective 
actions and thereby emissions trading. 
 
4.3 Economies in transition 
There are important differences between the EITs. Most of the Central European countries 
and some of the FSU are heavily dependent on imported energy. Several of these countries 
are expected to join the EU early in the twenty-first century, and several others hope to do so 
subsequently. They have consequently tended increasingly to align themselves with the EU 
position. Russia itself, however, remains a huge and resource-intensive country that has 
developed closer political ties to the United States than to the EU. With large amounts of hot 
air quotas, Russia would profit heavily from the possibility of an unrestricted quota trading 
system. So, in March 1997, the Russians submitted their own negotiating proposals in favor 
of emissions trading with flat-rate initial allocations from 1990 levels.  
 
4.4 Developing countries 
The majority of developing countries seem opposed to emissions trading. Their opposition is 
rooted in principles, fed by anger that emissions trading might enable the US to avoid 
significant domestic action and concern about the hot air problem. Although the Unites States 
emphasized that the targets set during the Kyoto negotiations would not constitute any more 
long-term right to emit, there was a deep fear that the whole question of long-term emissions 
entitlements was being pre-empted. 
 
4.5 The results of the Kyoto process  
Thus the EU and the developing countries strongly opposed emissions trading, while the other 
parties were positive (except for some EITs). For the United States, the issue of its inclusion 
in the Protocol was important enough to become one of the conditions for joining the 
agreement.  
 These conflicting positions resulted in a supplementarity cap that all could accept. This 
was one of the creative ambiguities that allowed countries to agree while fundamentally 
disagreeing. However, the problem of operationalizing the supplementarity cap remains to be 
resolved. Unfortunately, not much headway was made on this issue during the COP 6 in The 
Hague, either.  
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5 The arguments behind the EU position 
Several arguments have been used to defend the skepticism toward a fully flexible quota 
trading system, some of which have not been made explicit but are rather implied through 
cultural differences and different moral positions. Many of the arguments against an 
unrestricted quota market discussed below are either related to the expectation that distortions 
would exist in such a market) or that the goal of emissions reductions achieved through the 
negotiations is not the optimal one. In the following I will examine the most important of 
these arguments, and to some extent comment on their validity . 
 
5.1 Economic arguments 
Objections to allowance trading may derive from genuine concerns about the functioning of a 
market-based policy design at the international level. First, if the quota market is no longer 
competitive, marginal abatement costs would not be equalized across traders and an 
efficiency loss would arise. Furthermore, if these markets should have transaction costs, cost-
effectiveness could no longer be viewed as a situation where marginal abatement costs are 
equalized. And if marginal transaction costs are also included, this would affect the 
performance (the cost-effectiveness) of the system compared to other policy instruments. 
Finally, there could be ancillary benefits at the national level following from reductions of 
climate gases. This would affect the level of optimal emission reductions. All these factors 
have been used as arguments against an unrestricted quota trade. Below we discuss all three 
effects. 
 
5.1.1 Market power 
To achieve cost-effectiveness (and efficiency) in a tradable quota market, the market for 
quotas must be competitive. If certain agents could influence the price of quotas, cost-
effectiveness in the quota market would no longer be a result. Several authors have discussed 
the problem of market power in a tradable quota system, the first being Hahn (1984). 
Westskog (1996) discusses this problem in connection to an international tradable CO2 quota 
market.  
 For the purposes of illustration, assume that there is one large seller in this market 
denoted M. The rest of the agents are small. These small agents are in total a net buyer of 
quotas. They are referred to as “the fringe” and denoted F. The fringe emits climate gases 
until the marginal abatement costs equal the price of a quota. 
PeeC FFF =−′ )(
0         (11) 
The fringe demand function for quotas will thus be )(PQQ FF = , and the inverse demand 
function )( FQPP = where QF is the sum of quotas bought from the fringe.  
  The monopolist takes as given the fringe’s performance in the market and minimizes 
the abatement costs minus the income from selling quotas. 
MMMM
q
PqeeCMin
M
−− )( 0         (12) 
subject to )( FQPP = and MMM qqe −=
0  
 The first order condition of this minimization problem is 
MFMMM qQPPeeC )()(
0
′−=−′       (13) 
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which signifies that the monopolist sets marginal abatement costs equal to marginal revenue. 
The consequence is that marginal abatement costs given by equations (11) and (13) are not 
equalized across agents (monopolist and fringe), and cost-effectiveness is not achieved. The 
argument against free quota trade is connected to the inefficiency obtained from the existence 
of market power agents.  
 The questions are, however: 
1. Is the market power problem really of such dimensions that it is better to choose 
another policy instrument such as non-tradable quotas? 
2. Can the market be organized such that this problem does not become excessive? 
 In the study by Westskog (op.cit.), it is shown that that under specific conditions the 
market power exercised by certain agents in a tradable quota market could amount to a 10% 
efficiency loss compared to a competitive market. Seen in the context of the Richels et al 
(1996) study, which shows that a tradable quota system that allows for flexibility regarding 
where emission reductions are made can reduce costs by more than 60% compared to a 
system with no trade of quotas between agents, the market power problem can hardly be an 
argument against emissions trading. Further, concerns about market power effects could also 
be raised under supplementarity. In a study by Ellerman and Wing (2000), it is demonstrated 
that implementing supplementarity by imposing concrete ceilings on permit imports in a 
market for tradable emission rights gives rise to monopsonistic effects similar to those that 
characterize a buyer’s cartel. Limit permit import may lead to reduction in the costs of 
meeting importer’s emission control obligations for some levels of restrictions because of a 
lower price for quotas following from demand restrictions.  
 Because there is now an international antitrust law, the GHG quota trading market must 
be designed to deal with market power on its own terms. The way quotas are allocated, the 
way quotas are designed, who participates, and how many will participate  are important 
factors to determine the extent and effects of market power. The Westskog (op.cit.) study 
shows that the way quotas are initially allocated significantly influences the level of the 
efficiency loss from market power. Further, in a study by Hagem and Westskog (1998 ) which 
focuses on the intertemporal design of the tradable quotas, it is shown that quotas that are 
durable (last for more than one period) may reduce the market power problem at the cost of 
increasing inefficiency across periods, compared to a banking and borrowing system where 
quotas last for only one period, but where quotas can be banked or borrowed across periods.  
 
5.1.2 Transaction costs 
Transaction costs may also be a problem in a tradable quota market. Transaction costs may 
arise by limits and conditions imposed on emissions trading that can result in large search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and monitoring and enforcement costs. (See, 
for instance, Stavins 1995, which discusses this issue).  
 In a competitive market for tradable quotas where transaction costs exist, the agent 
would minimize the abatement costs plus the costs of buying quotas and the transaction costs 
of quota trade.  
)()( 0
,...,1
jjjjjj
qq
qtPqeeCMin
N
++−       (14) 
subject to: jjj qqe +=
0        (15)  
where tj(qj) signifies the transaction costs of quota trade and 0)( >′ jj qt .  )( jj qt ′′ may be 
positive, negative or zero-valued (ref. Stavins 1995) . 
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This minimization problem leads to the following first order condition 
jjjj tPeeC ′+=−′ )(
0   for all j= 1, ......,N    (16) 
 Hence, in contrast to the cost-effective solution with a tradable quota system with no 
transaction costs, marginal abatement costs are no longer equalized across agents. In the 
equilibrium with transaction costs, the agents set marginal abatement costs equal to the price 
of a quota plus the marginal transaction costs.  
 A clever design of the market and quotas could probably influence the extent of the 
problem with transactions costs. It is a difference between allowance-trading programs and 
credit-trading programs when it comes to the extent of the transaction cost problem. 
Allowance-trading programs impose on each agent an emissions target coupled with the 
possibility for each agent to engage in trade with the allowances authorized by this target. The 
emissions trading mechanism in the Kyoto Protocol is an allowance-trading mechanism. A 
credit-trading program, on the other hand, allows each agent to trade emissions reductions 
that are shown to be below the agent’s permitted level of emissions. The CDM is an example 
of a credit-trading mechanism. Credit-trading systems are project based and require that each 
source establish its emission baseline, permitted level and reduction plan.  An allowance 
might be comparable to a currency unit, whereas a credit might be better compared to a 
specific good whose value must be determined for each trade. Consequently, an allowance-
trading mechanism normally has very low transaction costs, whereas the transaction costs 
following from credit trades are much higher. (See UNCTAD 1998 for a further discussion of 
this issue). Hence, this is again more of a design issue than a question of restricting quota 
trade to obtain more favorable economic conditions for fulfilling the environmental goal.  
 
5.1.3 Ancillary benefits. 
Other arguments against following a cost-minimization strategy like full flexibility in 
emissions trading have also risen in the debate. Schleicher, Buchner and Kratena (2000) argue 
that GHG abatement activities can have various beneficial side effects. In addition to the 
reduction of emissions, abatement activities may also give rise to what they call ancillary 
benefits, e.g. the improvement of the quality of living in a building that was renovated for 
improving the thermal energy efficiency. The ancillary benefits are of a local and regional 
character, and come about in addition to the global effects of reductions of climate gases. 
 In this case, the level where the sum of marginal global benefits of abatement equals 
the marginal abatement costs no longer characterizes an efficient level of climate gases. The 
ancillary benefits warrant higher reduction levels of climate gases. The maximization problem 
is now given by 
 
= ==
−−−+−
N
j
jj
N
j
jjj
N
j
jj
ee
eeCeebeeBMax
N 1
0
1
0
1
0
,...,
)()()(
1
  (17) 
where )( 0 jjj eeb − signifies the ancillary benefits of agent j. 
 An optimal emissions level is in this case characterized by: 
)()()( 000
1
jjjjjj
N
j
j eeCeebeeB −′=−′+−′
=
 for all j=1,...,N (18)  
or, in other words, where the sum of the marginal global and local benefits of abatement  
equals marginal abatement costs. Hence, marginal abatement costs should not be equalized 
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across agents to reach efficiency or cost-effectiveness because of the agent-specific ancillary 
benefits. However, the question is whether or not the existence of ancillary benefits is an 
argument for restricting quota trade. Side-effects can be handled properly through the use of 
other national policy instruments in combination with a fully flexible tradable quota system, 
for example through the use of national taxes (see Hoel 1993b for a discussion of this issue).  
 
5.2 Hot air 
As explained in footnote 5, Parties that are allocated assigned amounts that exceed what their 
emissions would be even in the absence of any limitation contribute to the so-called hot air 
problem when other Parties purchase these quotas to help meet their targets. The EITs are 
expected to have a lot of hot air to trade on an emissions trading market. The hot air issue 
concerns the implications of their transferring to other Parties what may turn out to be a 
substantial surplus of quotas, and it is the opportunity to freely trade and bank hot air quotas 
that makes this a problem. If the hot air quotas can be sold or banked, they will not represent 
an equivalent emissions reduction amount in the seller or banking country. By transferring the 
surplus to a country that may use it, emissions increase more than they would in the absence 
of trading.  
 Allocating hot air quotas to some countries would not change the efficiency 
performance of the tradable quota market.  Cost-effectiveness will be achieved (as will 
efficiency if the goal is optimally chosen). As before, a country with hot air minimizes 
abatement costs minus the income from selling quotas (qj<0 for a country that sells quotas). 
jjjji
qq
PqeehCMin
N
+−+ )( 0
,...,1
      (19) 
subject to: jjj qqe +=
0        (20) 
where hj is the amount of hot air quotas allocated to agent j. Note that the amount of quotas 
allocated initially is the amount of hot air quotas plus the business as usual emissions of that 
country, i.e. 00 jjj ehq += . The first order condition of this minimization problem is 
equivalent to equation (10), i.e. PeehC jjjj =−+′ )(
0 . 
 The problem of allocating hot air quotas to countries is mainly a political one. 
Assigning to some countries large surpluses that are then transferred to the wealthiest 
countries, enabling them to avoid substantive action, will be seen by developing countries as 
violating the spirit of the Kyoto agreement and that of the Convention itself by violating the 
aim of developed-country leadership. Potentially, the most threatening aspect of hot air 
trading is its implications for the expansion of the regime. If countries presently within Annex 
B could trade and bank assigned amounts that do not correspond to equivalent emissions 
reductions, it would be difficult to negotiate an agreement with new countries that would have 
no possibility for hot air trading and banking. 
  The problems connected to the allocation of hot air quotas was one of the reasons that 
the EU, at the European Council of Ministers meeting in June 1997, concluded that 
mechanisms such as emissions trading should be supplementary to domestic actions and 
common coordinated policies and measures (Grubb et al 1999). They suggested restrictions 
on quota purchases and quota sales, where quota sales that are not a result of an equivalent 
emission reduction amount in the seller country should be restricted. However, the question is 
whether restrictions on quota trade could reduce the problem of hot air. Grubb et al (1999) 
argues that, as agreed in the Kyoto Protocol, a supplementarity cap on the amount of quotas 
that Parties purchase would not necessarily solve the problem of hot air. It could simply mean 
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that countries with real surplus assigned amounts would spread their hot air more widely 
among acquiring countries. A direct ceiling on sales from transferring countries, which is also 
suggested by EU, could be more effective. Holtsmark and Mæstad (2000) discuss what effects 
the proposed EU restrictions on quota trade would have on hot air trade. They find that the 
EU proposal effectively limits the amount of hot air released through the international market 
for emission permits. However, like Grubb (op.cit), they conclude that in order to reduce the 
hot air problem, the only appropriate action is restrictions on sales, and that restrictions on 
acquisitions of quotas is not justified.  
 
5.3 Technological Progress  
The requirement that emissions trading should be supplemental to domestic actions for the 
purposes of meeting commitments reflects the widespread concern that international 
flexibility may be used to avoid adequate domestic action. Stabilizing the atmosphere will 
require far-reaching changes in technology and patterns of economic behavior. The Kyoto 
commitments with full flexibility may turn out to be very lax for the OECD countries, with 
the consequence that they need not take much action at home. They might shoulder the 
burden of abatement globally, but only by spreading established techniques and never having 
to learn about other ways of doing things. If the richest nations never have to seriously change 
course, the prospects for long-term solutions are very remote. By contrast, if they are forced 
to implement some difficult measures at home, they might generate solutions that could then 
spread globally.  
 If the Parities had agreed on a more stringent emissions target, a more rapid 
technological change would probably be the result, even with full flexibility through emission 
trading. This was not achieved through the Protocol. However, the EU wanted a much more 
stringent emissions target than was achieved in Kyoto. As mentioned above, at the meeting of 
the EU Council of Ministers in March 1997, the EU collectively supported a position that all 
industrialized countries should reduce emissions to 15% below 1990 levels by 2010. With 
restrictions on emissions trading, they would be able to at least achieve the results of a more 
stringent target than one with full flexibility and 5.2% collective reduction. Since restrictions 
on quota trading will most likely increase quota prices (see Holtsmark and Mæstad 2000 for 
an empirical study of the implications of the EU suggestions on restrictions), the incentives to 
engage in R&D activities that can lead to technological progress that reduces dependency on 
fossil fuels will also increase. The result could then be a more rapid technological change than 
obtained otherwise (that is, without restrictions), and then a possibility to agree on a more 
ambitious target after the Kyoto period is over. This may be one motivation behind their 
skepticism toward emissions trading, and why they argued for a supplementarity cap in the 
negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol.  
 The EU’s argumentation on this issue reflects the fact that abatement investments may 
stimulate endogenous technological progress by improving factor productivity.  Most 
greenhouse gas abatement policy models that incorporate technological change treat such 
changes as autonomous, that is, unaffected by changes in prices brought about by policy 
reforms. However, the rate of technological change responds to policy initiatives. Climate 
change policies, in particular, by raising the prices of conventional carbon-based fuels can 
create economic incentives to engage in more extensive research and development oriented 
toward the discovery of new production techniques that involve a reduced reliance on 
conventional fuels. In addition, such policies may lead to increased R&D aimed at 
discovering new ways to produce alternative, non-carbon based fuels. To the extent that 
expanded R&D efforts bear fruit, they lead to technological progress. Thus, climate policies, 
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R&D, and technological progress are connected: there is an induced component to 
technological change.8 
 Autonomous technological change may be represented very simply by including these 
effects in the cost-function of each agent. The higher the amount of emissions reductions, the 
higher the rate of technological change. Hence, we would have the following abatement cost 
function, denoted IjC , and different from Cj in equation (3): 
))(),(( 00 jjjjjj
I
j eeIeeCC −−=       (21) 
where Ij signifies the technological change obtained by abatement activities, I’j>0 and 
0<′
jIC . This would mean that for every level of abatement activities the cost of abatement 
is now lower and this warrants a higher total emissions reduction level than obtained through 
the efficiency considerations in section 3.1. (However, still 00 >′
− jj ee
C ).  Hence, if these 
effects are not included in the considerations when the goal of emissions reductions is 
decided, the goal could be said to be to lax, and by restricting quota trade we would get a 
higher level of technological change which could reduce the abatement costs and allow the 
possibility of negotiating a more stringent target at the next crossroads.  
 Arguments raised around the autonomous technological change effects are also 
connected to the uneven distribution of opportunities for other agents to introduce technical 
innovation.  If the rate of technological change depends upon who abates, free trade of quotas 
would influence this rate. For example, if the EIT countries have few opportunities to 
introduce technological innovation through their abatement activities, whereas the abatement 
activities carried out by other Annex B countries would induce technological change, sale of 
quotas from EIT countries to other Annex B countries would reduce technological change. 
Hence, this might be a valid argument for quota restrictions, since we would expect that the 
EITs would be sellers of quotas and many other Annex B countries, buyers. 
 
5.4 Ethical arguments 
The arguments for cost-effectiveness and cost-effective policy instruments are based on a 
consequentialistic ethical thinking. Various climate policy instruments should be ranked in 
accordance with their consequences. The policy instrument that generates the best 
consequences, e.g. the most cost-effective emissions reductions, should then be chosen.   
 On the other hand, those holding a deontological ethical position focus on the 
disposition behind the act and on demands that we should act in agreement with duties and 
rights (not justified by the value of the consequences from actions). The justification for those 
rights and duties vary; examples include the ideas that human beings are created in the image 
of God, that some fundamental duties and rights are somehow included in universal reason, or 
that basic duties and rights can be derived from the categorical imperative (See Kant 1996).  
The deontological views connected to quota trade incorporate two elements. First, one could 
argue that there exist absolute standards that we should uphold in our management of the 
                                                     
8 Goulder and Schneider (1999) discuss the significance of endogenous technological change for the 
attractiveness of carbon abatement. They conclude that climate policies are generally more attractive 
when the impacts of these policies on technological change are taken into consideration.  Schleicher, 
Buchner and Kratena (2000) also discuss the issue of endogenous technological change and they 
conclude that “creating appropriate long-term incentives through GHG abatement policies will be an 
effective way to encourage technical progress which is an important force for improving 
competitiveness and stimulating economic growth.”  
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natural environment.9 These standards should define the goal of emission reductions, and not 
the consequentialistic method defined through the efficiency considerations in equation  (3). 
The point here is that the deontological principles (duties/rights) represent additional 
constraints on efficiency considerations that should not be violated, regardless of the costs of 
respecting the duties/rights. However, proponents of these views would often accept a cost-
effective method of achieving the exogenously defined goal, such as emissions trading. 
Another view also rooted in deontological considerations, and often an extension of the view 
above, is that pollution that causes systematic, foreseeable and preventable harm should be 
avoided. The reason for this is that pollution inflicts injury to living beings’ inherently 
valuable capacity for flourishing. From this point of view, tradable allowances can be seen as 
a license to pollute, particularly if grandfathering is used as a principle for initial distribution, 
and an unsuitable policy instrument.10  
 In Europe, the Green parties and various environmental groups have been quite 
influential. They often use deontological arguments like those mentioned above and are quite 
hostile toward emissions trading. These groups appear to be more influential in European 
politics than their counterparts in US politics. Environmental groups in the United States have 
traditionally been hostile toward allowance trading, until several policies using tradable 
allowances were adopted and proved successful. (Weiner 1997). 
 The European position toward emissions trading can also be understood in a cultural 
context. The deontological views can be traced back to Kant. In Kant’s view, what gives an 
action moral worth is not the outcome of that action, but the motivation behind the action. 
The categorical imperative is Kant’s famous statement of this duty: “Act only according to 
that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”. 
(Kant 1996). Other philosophers such as Spinoza have also been influential in Europe. 
Spinoza believed that everything that exists is God, or to put it differently, that God, 
Substance and Nature are at the deepest level the same. (Næss 1977).  Traces of his thoughts 
on this issue can be found in Goethe’s work. Goethe rejects the principle of an all-powerful 
Father God, while embracing the image of Earth as a nurturing mother. (Chapman 1999). 
Against this tradition stands the Benthamite perspective in which pollution is seen as market 
failure to be corrected by market pragmatism, and which is a tradition that is much more 
important in the American context. (Bentham 1948) 
 These cultural differences also play an important role within Europe. The deontological 
views found in Kant’s philosophy and the non-anthropocentric views in Spinoza’s and 
Goethe’s works have naturally been especially important in Germany, but also in continental 
Europe, whereas the Benthamite perspective has been more important in England. The 
hostility toward emissions trading follows the same lines. (See Tosteson 1998). 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper I have tried to clarify the background and arguments behind the EU position in 
the Kyoto negotiations that quota trading should be restricted and the bulk of emission 
reductions conducted domestically.  
An unrestricted quota trade will (at least in theory) result in a cost-effective allocation of 
emissions reductions among participants in the agreement. If quota trade is restricted, this will 
no longer be the case. The arguments for restricting trade should therefore be weighty. Some 
                                                     
9 These views can be found in the ecological economic approach to sustainability put forward by, e.g., 
Herman Daly (1993).  
 
10 Weiner (1997) briefly discusses this last issue. 
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of the arguments raised above have these characteristics. In this paper I have discussed the 
following arguments:  
• Economic arguments for restrictions, which could be threefold: (1) that the market for 
quotas will give rise to inefficiencies through the presence of market power; (2) that 
transaction costs may arise; and (3) that the emphasis on the global benefits of quota trade 
might detract attention from local or regional ancillary benefits.   
• Hot air. If the hot air quotas can be sold or banked they will not represent an equivalent 
emission reduction in the seller or banking country. By transferring the surplus to a 
country that may use it, emissions may increase more than they would be in the absence 
of trading. It could be argued that quota trade should be restricted to reduce the hot air 
problem.  
• Technological progress. Restrictions on emissions trading are likely to encourage more 
rapid technological innovation since the quota price will increase, which could bring 
more opportunities for increased emission reductions in the future. Moreover, the uneven 
distribution of opportunities for technological innovation between countries could also be 
put forward as an argument for restrictions. If technological change is dependent upon 
who abates, free trade would influence the rate of technological change. 
• Ethics. According to a deontological ethical position, one could argue that pollution that 
causes systematic, foreseeable, and preventable harm should be avoided. From this point 
of view tradable, allowances can be seen as a license to pollute, at least if the quotas are 
initially distributed on a principle of grandfathering, and thus an unsuitable policy 
instrument. 
  I argue here that both a deontological position and the existence of autonomous 
technological change point toward restricting quota trade. In addition, restrictions on the sale 
of quotas could be effective in reducing the hot air problem. However, it is arguable that 
restricting net acquisitions is not justifiable as a means to reduce the hot air problem. 
Moreover, the economic arguments, in my opinion, are not sufficiently weighty to justify 
restrictions of quota trade. 
 The argumentation explored in this paper gives rise to two important questions that 
have not been fully discussed here. First, what explanation does the EU itself give for its 
position on emissions trading? I have touched upon this question in the discussion of the 
ethical arguments by pointing at the cultural differences between Europe and the United 
States where the cultural context in Europe could have given more room for deontological 
arguments. However, a lot of other explanations could also be put forward, one of which is 
trade rivalry. Some countries may favor high-cost policy designs because even though such a 
policy would be costly for them, it would cost their trade rivals far more. Industries in Europe 
may want to impose higher costs on their rivals in the US and Japan by insisting on non-
tradable quotas, which the Europeans would be able to meet at lower costs than could their 
rivals. Flexible and comprehensive policies would erase this cost advantage for European 
industry. Preliminary evidence suggests that the industrialized countries that oppose or would 
limit allowance trading are also the countries that face low abatement costs relative to the 
other industrialized countries. (Weiner 1997).  
 Second, what are the concrete implications of the EU proposal for the different issues 
raised in this paper, and are the proposed restrictions too tight or too loose to achieve the 
intention of the proposal? In this paper I have referred to the paper of Holtsmark and Mæstad 
(2000) where the implications on the EU proposal for the hot air problem is analyzed. 
However, much remains to be studied. For instance, what are the implications for 
technological change and at what costs? In other words, how much do total costs of emissions 
reductions increase as a consequence of trading restrictions? It is important to consider these 
issues are to evaluate whether restrictions on quota trade really are worth the effort.   
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